An unexpected connection on LinkedIn. A proposal of employment from a recruiter, probably a female agent, based in the Asian nation. The opportunity to make around £20,000 on the side preparing a small number of geopolitical analyses for a Chinese company containing confidential or privileged insights. Payment in cryptocurrency or cash preferred.
It might appear obvious, in this scenario, that something about this approach would be amiss. However, Beijing's powerful intelligence agency continues to view it valuable to use headhunters to try it – leading the domestic spy agency to warn repeatedly about their activity on the internet.
Massive Contact Attempts on Social Media
Last year, the head of MI5 Ken McCallum said operatives from China were approaching UK citizens on LinkedIn on an extraordinary scale, at a frequency of 10,000 over the preceding two and a half years, seeking governmental, industrial, military and scientific classified information. But a new campaign aimed at elected officials and Westminster has prompted the intelligence service to take further action.
An espionage alert was issued on Tuesday via the offices of the Commons speaker and his House of Lords equivalent: a single slide after the persistent attempts of certain individuals and Amanda Qiu to contact MPs, peers, their staffers, economists, research organizations – anybody who might become a source.
Security Strategy and Legal Updates
In the typical style of UK security services, there was no official release of the security advice from the agency or the Home Office. But the service knew its briefing note would become public once it was emailed out to parliament. Republishing it in the press helps the general population better identify communications with a deceptive intent.
The alert has the effect of uncovering additional details from in and around parliament, although that is not the agency's primary purpose. The service wants people in public life to understand that just because interactions on LinkedIn are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are without risk.
Nor is internal security service believed to have been responding to any specific incident in the legislature, though the recent actions does come after the embarrassing failure of the prosecution of a ex-assistant Christopher Cash and his associate another person on a technicality earlier in the autumn.
Both individuals had been charged of working for the foreign power – a allegation they rejected – but inability to successfully conclude a trial under the now repealed Official Secrets Act resulted in warnings that the UK's political system had been insufficiently defended.
Updated Laws and Beijing's Strategic Interests
Legislation has now been changed, and the MI5 slide contains a reminder of its successor: “Individuals involved in espionage activity face substantial criminal penalties under the new security law.” It is a crime if somebody participates in conduct that could potentially “materially assist a foreign intelligence service”.
A natural question, however, is what Beijing has to gain. An elected representative who is not a government minister will have limited access of sensitive information, and an associate of theirs less so. Yet Beijing is particularly focused in parliament: for a period, in recent years, the UK’s China policy on issues such as the telecom firm or the human rights situation or genocide was being influenced by parliamentarians.
Methodological Differences and Persistent Digital Risks
To a degree there are distinct approaches too. Authoritarian governments like China’s export intelligence collection techniques and the size of its intelligence apparatus is enormous, employing 300,000 people. A former US official, a US national cyber director under president Joe Biden, commented it was sometimes estimated that “the Chinese have greater linguistic capacity engaged in this than Western agencies have English speakers”.
The Chinese government is willing to cultivate contacts over the long term and sometimes even the agencies have found it difficult to distinguish between genuine connections and espionage. “China has a minimal requirement for which details is considered to be useful,” security minister Dan Jarvis informed parliamentarians on this week, but a sudden turn in the political cycle may mean an individual rapidly peripheral becomes significant.
An alternative perspective to think about the relentless efforts at covert information gathering is in the wider context of the geopolitical contest between Beijing and the Western nations at a threshold under the level of direct conflict. China has stepped up its cyber operations, with the one campaign infiltration of phone and data networks in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon breach of millions internet devices.
Beijing is engaged in relentless efforts to find covert sources on UK politics via digital means because it seeks to be challenging, to demonstrate power and because it can.
